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PARTIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES

A statute, it is accepted, may be constitutional in
some and unconstitutional in other of its parts. Does
the taint affecting a part, affect the whole. May the
act be deemed, as to some provisions, or as to some applications of the same provisions, valid while as to others it
is invalid?
Cooley observes': "A statute may contain
some such provisions (i. e. unconstitutional) and yet the
same act having received the sanction of all branches
of the legislature, and being in the form of law may contain other useful and salutory provisions, not obnoxious
to any just constitutional exception. It would be inconsistent with all just principles of constitutional law,
to adjudge their enactments void, because they are associated in the same act but not connected with or depenWhere
dent on others which are unconstitutional.
therefore a part of a statute is unconstitutibnal that

'Constitutiounl Limitations 246.
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fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in
subject matter, depending on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected
together in meaning, that it cannot be presumed the
legisature would have passed the one without the other."
Anterior and Subsequent to Enactment
The cases to which the act is applicable may have
arisen before, or after its enactment. The very
same act, sentence and clause, of that act may for some
reason, be unconstitutional with respect to cases arising
before, and not with respect to cases arising after it.
Then the act will be constitutional as regards the latter
class and unconstitutional as regards the former. Let
us suppose that heretofore, an oral contract for the
sale of land.' an oral acceptance of a bill of exchange,
has been enforceable, and that a statute is now passed
declaring that no contract for the sale of land; no acceptance, shall be valid unless in writing. The law would be
held good as to future contracts or acceptances, but void
as to contracts and acceptances already entered into.A state act is void which impairs the obligation of a contract. Whether it impairs such obligation, depends on
its having been in existence when the contract was made,
or its having come into existence subsequently. In such
cases -the very same part of a statute is both constitutional and unconstitutional. It will constitutionally regulate contracts made after its passage, and will be unconstitutional with respect to preceding conitracts. The
courts will not hesitate to classify contracts, by date with
respect to the time of enactment by the law, and hold
the law void, as to earlier, and valid as-to later contracts.
No state may pass an ex post facto law.
This quality of being ex post facto depends wholly
'U. S. v. Quincy, 71 U. S. 535.
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on the respective dates of the origin of the law, and of
the criminal transaction to which it is to be applied.
If the perpetration of the crime preceded the statute, its
application to the crime will be prohibited; if the perpetration followed the statute, it will be valid. The court
will again classify the crimes into those which precede,
and those which follow the enactment, -holding the law
void, with respect to the former, valid with respect to the
latter. Says Cooley.' A legislative act may be entirely valid as to some classes of cases, and clearly void as
to othera. A general law for the punishment of offences,
which would endeavor to reach by its retroactive operation, acts before committed, as well as to prescribe a rule
of conduct for the citizen in the future, would be void
so far as it was retrospective; but such invalidity would
not affect the operation of the law in regard to the
cases which were within the legislative control. A law
might be void as violating the obligation of existing contracts, but valid as to all contracts which should be entered into subject to its passage, and which therefore would
have no legal force except such as the law itself would
allow."
Other classifications of cases, not founded on relative time of occurrence, have been made by the courts,
and acts held valid in respect to some, and invalid as to
other of these classes. Men e. g. may be engaged in the
sale of only wine and beer, or they may sell also spirituous and other intoxicating liquors. An act of the state
of Texas which imposed an annual tax on those who sold
"spirituous, malt and other intoxicating liquors,'-, but
exempted from tax the sellers of "wines or beer manufactured in this state" was considered unconstitutional,
'Const.Limit. 250, adopted by Fuler, C. J., in Jaehne v. State

of New York, 128 U. S. 189.
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as to those who sold only wines and beer, the manufacture of other states, but not unconstitutional as to those
who sold not only wines and beer, the product of other
states, but also "spirituous". and "other intoxicating liquors", than wines and beer. One who sold spirituous liquors as well as wines and beer, the product of
other states was held liable to pay the tax. If he had
sold only nonTexan wines and beer, he would not have
been liable.' Although the Texan legislature did not
take the pains to make the classification, the court did
so, and upheld the statute as to one of the classes, although ready to annul it as to the other.
The propriety of classifying cases, which have not
been classified by the statute, and affirming the validity
of the statute as to one class, while denying it as to the
other, has not been conceded in a considerable number
of cases.
The 15th Amendment to the Constitution declares
that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridgedby the United States or by any state, on account of race,
color or previous conditions of servitude, and it gives to
Congress power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation. "The 4th section of the act of May 31st
1870, provides for the punishment of any person who
shall by bribery, etc., hinder or delay any citizen from
doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote,
or from voting at any election. It does not say who shali
hinder or delay, etc., "on account of race, color or
previous condition of servitude". Inspectors of elections who refused to receive and count the votes of nogroes, because they were such, were indicted under this
section Was the section valid? Congress can, by the
15th amendment, punish election officers who deny to a
"Tiernan v, Rinker, 102 U. S. 128.
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negro voter the right to vote, because of his race, but
not for denying that right for any other reason. The
court refused to divide acts of denial into denial for race,
or color, and denials for other reasons, and to hold the
act of 1870 constitutional, when applied to the former
class, and unconstitutional when applied to the latter.
Unless it appears, say the majority of the court, that it
was the intention of congress "thus to limit the operation of the act, we cannot give it that effect". That is,
congress can punish acts designed to prevent -votingby a
negro, because he is a negro, but not for some other reason. If it intends to punish both the acts which it has
the power to punish, and also other acts which, it has not
the power to punish, and does not express the sub-classification, but expresses only the classification, the act
is void, not merely with respect to acts beyond the con.
gressional power to punish, but also acts within such
power. The statute's being "penaF' is mentioned. Chief
Justice Waite thinks it would be dangerous "if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside (inside
what?) and say who shall be rightfully detained and
who should be set at large." Dangerous to whom? The
defendant unlawfully prevents a citizen's voting. Congress provides for the punishment of the act. If the motive
of the act was repugnance to a negro's voting, Congress
has the power to punish it. If the motive was different,
Congress has not the power. If congress has the power
to punish a species of acts, it must not punish the genus.
Punishing too wide a class is the same thing as punishing no member of it.'
A later case' cites the one just considered. Sect. 5519
of the Revi.ed Statutes enacted that if, in any state or
iUuited States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214.
'United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629.
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territory two or more persons conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or the premises of another for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privilegies or
immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of hinder.
ing the authorities of any state or territory from secur.
ing to all persons the equal protection of the lawso ney
shall be punished with fine and imprisonment. Harris
eb al were indicted under this act. Was the act constitutional? If it was, it was so because of the 13th
Amendment, which says that slavery and involuntary
servitude except for crime shall not exist within -the
United States, and that Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Woods
J. concludes that this amendment does not warrant the
statute, because its provisions are broader than the
Amendment justifies. The observations of the justice
are peculiar. Under the statute, it would be an offense
for two white persons to deprive another white person
of the equal protection of the laws, or for two colored
persons to deprive a white person or a colored person
who had never been a slave. A law which punishes
white person for going in disgiuse to deprive another
white person of a right to make a contract, sue, give evidence, cannot be authorized by an amendment which
prohibits slavery. Because the section 5519 punishes
other acts than those which could be considered as enslaving or reducing to or holding in servitude, it was
thought to be unconstitutional. The acts charged in the
indictment however could by no ingenuity be considered
reducing to slavery or involuntary servitude. They
were assaults on negroes while under arrest in the custody of officers of the state of Tennessee. There is an
intimation in the opinion that the legislation might be
sustained in a territory, though not sustained in a state,
that is, the statute having classified the forbidden acts
as those happening in a territory, and those happening
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in a state, the courts might sustain it, with respect -to
the former class, thouigh treating it as void with respect to the latter class.
Another case founded on the same statute was a
habeas corpus to procure the discharge of a man who
was arrested and detained on a charge of having conspired to deprive certain Chinese of the equal protection of the laws, and of equal privileges and immunities
-under the laws, and of having violently expelled them
from their places of residence and business. It was
suggested that though Congress had not the power to
punish for such acts against a citizen, it would punish
them if they were a violation of rights secured to a foreigner by a treaty, and that they were a violation of such
rights. Hence, it was argued, although the act is unconstitutional, as to acts committed against a citizen, it
is valid as to acts which violate the treaty rights of foreigners. Says Waite C. J., to give effect to the principle that an act may be constitutional in one part, while
unconstitutional as to another, "the parts-that which
is constitutional and that which is unconstitutional-must
be capable of separation so that each may be read by itself. This statute, considered as a statute punishing conspiracies in a state, is not of that character, for in that
connection it has no parts within the meaning of the
rule * * * A single provision which makes up the whole
section, embraces those who conspire against citizens
as well as those who conspire against aliens-those who
conspire to deprive one of his rights under the laws of a
state and those who conspire to deprive him of his
Tights under the constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States. The limitatibn which is sought must be
made, if at all, by construction, not by separation. This,
"Cf. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678.
'Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678.
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it has -often been decided, is not enough." If Congress
has power to provide for the punishment of conspiracies against certain persons, or certain kinds of,conspiracies against persons a general enactment punishing conspiracies will not be upheld even as to the conspiracies
against the persons or the particular sorts of conspiracy that might have been constitutionally punished.
Congress passed an act which provided for the
registration of trade-marks, and another for the punish..
.fent of the unauthorized use of these trade-marks."
It did not distinguish between trade-marks used in inter-state or inter-national and trade-marks used in
intra-state commerce. Tacitly assuming that the power over inter-state or international commerce might include that over trade-marks used in such commerce,
Miller, J., held that the act was wholly void, because
the words in the act showed that Congress did not
intend to make the distinction. "It is not within the
judicial province to give the words used by Congress a
narrower meaning than they are manifestly intended
to bear, in order that crimes may be punished which
are not described in language that brings them within
the constitutional power of that body;" that is, the
courts will not hold such an act valid, as to trade-marks
used in inter-state commerce, if its prohibition in terms
covers all trade-marks without regard to their being.
inter-state or intra-state trade-marks. Miller, J., says
that if the court enforced the statute in certain cases
falling under the terms, without being willing to enforce
it in the other cases, "It ig quite probable we should
do what, if the matter were now before that body, it
would be unwilling to do, namely, make a Wade-mark
law which is only partial in its operation, and which
*TrAe-marks -Caaes, 100 U. S. 82.
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would complicate the rights which parties could hold in
some instances under the Act of Congress, and in others
under state law." The probable willingness of 'the Congress now to enact a statute, which some previous Congress has enacted, can hardly influence the will of a
court to enforce the statute. Is it not a reasonable inference, from the enactment of the trade-mark law, that
Congress intended its provisions to operate, in so far
as its master, the court, would allow it to operate? The
"complication of rights" which affrights the justice, existed exclusively in his morbid imaginaton!
An act of assembly of Virginia, directed that the.
coupons and bond- issued by the state, should be receivable in payment of taxes due the state." It subsequently passed an act, forbidding the acceptance of such coupons, in payment of taxes. A later act also provided
that when payment in money of taxes was improperly
insisted on, the remedy of the tax payer should be simply
an action to recover back the money. A citizen offered
coupons in payment of taxes which were refused.
Therefore, the collector levied on personal property. Anx
action of detinue was then brought, in the state court, to
liberate the property from the distress.
It was contended that even if the act forbidding the receipt of taxes in coupons was unconstitutional, so much of it or its
supplements as directed that the only redress of the taxpayer should be the payment of the tax in money, and
an action to recover the money, or proof of the -tenderto
the collector and its rejection by him, of the coupons, was
constitutional, since a state may regulate the process by
which the improper exaction of taxes may be remedied.
M tthews, J., said: "The Acts of Assembly must be taken
together, as one is but an amendment of the other. The
'Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270.
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scheme of the whole is indivisible." The primary act,
forbidding the tax collector's receiving coupons in payment of taxes, is void. "That which is merely auxiliary
to the main design, must also fall with the principal
of which it is merely an incident." When one part of
an act is unconstitutional, another part can be upheld
when the parts are so distintively separable that each
can stand alone, and where the court is able to see and
to declare that the intention of the Legislature was that
he part pronounced valid should be enforceable even
though the other part should fail. To hold otherwise
would be to substitute for the law intended by the Legislature one they may*never have been willing by itself to
en.act."

The state of Tennessee adopted a quarantine line
for cattle running from west to east through the state,
having on one side, the southern part, and -on the other
side, the northern part of the state. Paragraph 709 of
the Revised Statutes of he United States -authorized the
Secretary of Agriculture to establish a quarantine line
He substituted, in
from California to Maryland.
Tennessee for the line promulgated by him, the line in
Tennessee, adopted by the authorities of that state, and
forbad the transportation of cattle from the southern
side of this line to the northern. One whose cattle were
infected, north of the line in Tennessee," by cattle brought
from south of it, by a railroad company, sued the R.
R. Company for damages. The sole ground of recovery,
was that the transportation of the cattle violated
the order of the Secretary of Agriculture. If Congress
could depute to the Secretary, the making of orders, it
could do so only in the regulation of inter-state commerce. The Secretary's order would have to be limited
"Illinois C. R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514.
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to transportation of cattle from one state to another
state. It could not embrace, not only these transportations, but those from one part of a state to other parts
of the same state. If it did embrace both sets of transportations, it would be wholly void, not merely as to intra-state, but also as to inter-state transportations.
Hence though the cattle were received south of the
Tennessee quarantine line, and carried into Kentucky,an act of inter-state commerce-no liability came simply from the breach of the order of the Secretary of
Agriculture.
"Nor have we the power", says Justice
Day, "to so limit the Secretary's order as to make it apply only to inter-state commerce, which it is urged, is
all that is here intended. For aught that appears on the
face of the order, the Secretary intended it to apply to
all commerce, and whether he would 'have made such an
order, if strictly limited to inter-state commerce, we have
no means of knowing. The order is in terms single and
is indivisible."
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MOOT COURT
ESTATE OF O'HARA
Wills-Charitable Bequests-Latent Ambiguity
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John O'Hara wrote a will tbenty-eight days before his death
irt hich, bequeathing sums to a church, a monastery and a college,
he bequeathed $1000 to "the pastor of the St. Miatthews i. C.
Church of Johnstown." At that time Rev. Mr. Flynn was pastor. A 7ew days afterwards ,he was removed, to another church and
Rev. Thomas Farley succeeded him, and 'was pastor at the time of
O'Hara's death. The -legacy of $1000 is claimed by both thfee
priests. The legatees object to paying either, because the will was
not attested by -two subscribing witnesses, and because O'Hara died
in less than a calendar month after the writing of the will.
Lichtenstein, for the plaintiff.
Todd, for the efendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FISHER, J. As the testator died within a calendar month after the execution of the will, and the same was not attested by
two subscribing witnesses, the first question necessary to determine is 'whether the bequest of $1000 was to the pastor individually, or to him in trust for the church, for if the latter be correct,
the -bequest is void under the act of April 26, 1855, which provides: "No estate, real or personal, shall hereafter be bequeathed, devised or conveyed to any body politic, or to any person, in
trust for religious or charitable uses, except the same be done by
deed or will, attested by two creditable, and at the time, disinterested witnesses, at least one calendar month before the death of
the testator, and all dispositions of property contrary hereto shall
be void, and go to the residuary legatee or devisee, next of kin, or
heirs, according to law."
A case similar to the present is Hodnetts Estate, 154 Pa. 485,
where the testator, after certain gifts to charity, provided that the
residue and ,remainder, if any, should go to "the pastor of the St.
John'is R. C. Church, of Altoona, Pa." This codicil was executed
within one calenrdar month, and was there held to be void as to cer-
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tain charitable bequests therein, but the gift "to the pastor" was
held to be to him individually, and not in trust for the church, and
therefore valid.
It does not. appear from the facts here .that either priest was
present 'when the will was executed, or -had been consulted concerning, or knew of the -will. In the absence of- any such
circumstances and of any secret agreement between the legatee
and the testator, there is nothing to show that the legacy in
question was given in trust "to the pastor of St. Matthews R. C.
Church, or that such pastor should devote this particular legacy
to charitable or religious uses or purposes. "A gift mill not b0e
deemed charitable merely from the nature of the professional
character of the devisee, or on, account of the testatorl having
.accompanied the gift with an expression of his expectations that
the devisee would discharge the duties incidental to such a character, however intimately those duties may concern the welfare
of others, as this merely denotes the motive of the gift, and not
that the devisee is to take otherwise than beneficially." 1 Jarman
on Wills 193.
In the absence of facts or circumstances tending to fasten
upon the priest a trust for either charitable or religious purposes,
he is entitled as legatee in his own right to the fund in question.
Hodnett's Estate, supra. Even if the fund had been paid -without
objection, there is nothing in the will that would afford the slightest ground on which the church or congregation or any religious
or charitable organization connected therewith could ever succeei
in holdiiig him as a trustee of the fund so received:. The bequest
-as therefore not void under the statute.
Having decided that the bequest is to be individual and therefore not void, the next question presented for determination is as
to which of the two priests should receive the $1000, Rev. Parley,
who vas in charge of the church at the time of O'Hara's death,
or Rev. Flynn, the pastor at the date of The will. This must be
answered by reference to the intention of the testator as expressed in the will, and to be ascertained from. the circumstances of
the case.
Where an ambiguity in a will is to be determined, circumstances indicative of the state of the testator's intention, affections
toward the qbject of his bounty, or the relative circumstances of
his connections, and his acts and declarations in respect to the
thing given or per-on of the donee, are to be considered. Brownfield v. Brownfield, 12 Pa. 136; Wagner's Appeal, 43 Pa. 102;
Snyder's Ftate, 217 Pa. 71; .Amberson's Estate, 204 Pa. 397.
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In Root's Estate, 187 Pa. 118, the testator gave a legacy to
He had a blood nephew, William
his "nephew William Root."
Root, son of a brother; there was also a William Root, a nephew
of his 'wife. It 'was held that the intention of the testator was
that the blood nephew should receive the gift. In Parwell v. Bidd e, 2 Dallas 70, a legacy giVen to "Samuel" was -held to be intended for William, though there were persons of each name, as
thi testator did not know Samuel but did know William.
These and other similar cases illustrate that the intention
of the testator at the time of Tmaking the bequest will govern as
to the disposition of the property, when such intention can be discovered from the will and surrounding circumstances, this being
the object of the courts at all times in construing a will, that is,
they attempt to carry out the intentions of the testator. In the
present case, in the light of the above cases, no other reasonable
interpretation can be given to the language used than that O'Hara
intende, the gift to Rev. Flynn, who was pastor at the date of
his will. It is reasonable to suppose that he had been pastor of
the church for a sufficient period of time ior the decedent to become well acquainted with him, and attached or devoted, to him,
personally and in his official position. According to the usual
custom, a pastor who succeeds another is not a resident of the
community in which the church is located, but comes from another neighborhood, generally sufficiently removed that he is not
known by the people of his new charge. Therefore, it can be assumed, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that the testator did not know Rev. Farley.
Both answer to the description, "the pastor of St. Matthews
R. C. Church of Johnstown," one being pastor at the date of the
will and the other at the time the will took effect, at the testator's
death. As between these two men, both answering the description
in the will, one of whom the testator did not know and the other
with whom he was friendly and acquainted, it must be considered
that his intention was to make the gift to his friend, whom he no
When he executed the will, the
doubt respected and esteemed.
testator did not anticipate any change in pastors, not having any
good ground for so doing, and he probably thought the words
would sufficiently designate the recipient of the gift, his confidant,
Rev. Flynn.
In view of the above authorities, we feel it incumbent upon us
to hold that Rev. Flynn, being the person intended by the testator to take the fund of $1000, is entitled thereto, to the exclusion
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of Rev. Parley and the legatee's, and decree that distribution be
made accordingly.
OPINION of SUPERIOR COURT
We concur in the opinion of the Orphans' Court, that the
gift to "the pastor of the St. Mlatthews' R. C. Church of Johnstown" was a gift, not to the church, but to the man who was pastor, and for himself. The bequest then, does not fall under the
operation of the act of 1855.
The remaining question is, which of two "pastors" of the
church was intended; the person who was pastor when the will
was written and the person who was pastor when the will began
to operate by the testator's death. Something could be said in
defense of either interpretation.
The phrase used has became
manifestly ambiguous.
If the testator intended Rev. Father
Flynn, why did, -he not, on the removal of that priest, and the
appointment of his successor, alter the phrase of the will, which
had become uncertain in meaning; if he intended, to make Father
Flynn his beneficiary? On the other hand, the reasons suggested by the learned court below for adopting the view that Father
Flynn was intended are persuasive.
In Anshutz v. Miller, 81
Pa. 212, a devise of income was made to John P. Anshutz, as long
as he should live, "and after his death his widov is entitled to said'
income." It was -held that this person was the present wife of
John P. Anshultz, and not any future wife who might survive him.
Says Jarman, 1 Wills 597 (Edition of 1880). If a testator gives
an estate or a sum of -money to his son John, the gift will take
effect in favor of his son of this name, if any, at the date of the
will, and of him only. If therefore such son should die in the testator's lifetime, and he should afterwards have another son of the
same name, who should survive him, such after-born son would not
be an object of the gift.
If we could know Whether what induced the gift was the
personal qualities and relations of Father Flynn, -and not his
pastorate of St. Matthews, or was the pastorate alone, we could
decide with a greater sense of certainty. We shall never know
what the fact was. Only speculation and conjecture 'are left
to us. It is clear that only one legatee was intended. We must
declare the bequest void for uncertainty of beneficiary, or we must
guess. The learned court below has guessed as shrewdly as we
can.
Appeal dismissed,
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JANTINIAL v. SMERCET
Injunction-To Restrain Publication of a Letter, Omitting the Date
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Four weeks before the primary election the plaintiff publicly
refused to be a candMiate on the Democratic ticket for sheriff of
Cumberland County, and had published in the Democratic newspapers of the county, a letter to that effect. Two weeks later
On
he changed his mind and actively sought the nomination.
the next day the defendant, the proprietor of a Republican newspaper, with knowledge of all the facbs, published in his paper the
plaintiff's former letter of declaration, omitting the date. The
plaintiff then filed this bill asling that a repetition of such publication be enjoined.
Kane, for the plaihtif.
Miller, for the d6fendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GORSON, J. The questions to be decided in -this case are:
(1) Is there a property right? (2) Was there a publication? (.2)
If there was not a property right, or if there haid 'been one but lost
through publication, may the plaintiff still be entitled to an in
Junction?
Let us consider the first point. In 22 Cyc. 749, it is stated
that "the existence bf a right violated is a prereauisite to the
granting of an injunction". The plaintiff has no pronerty right,
nor does he allege the violation of -any. It is true that one has
an intellectual property right in his private letters, whether of
literary value or not, -nd that he has a right to restrain an mnauthorized publication of it. 'Pomeroy on Equity 59. The rights
of Pennsylvania, are
of authors in their works, under the lIs
simply in unpublished works. The rights after publication are
protected by the United States copyright laws. Gendell v. Ott,
13 Phila. 191. Thus it is clear, that when one publishes his intellectual property right without first obtaining a copyright thereof, he thereby loses his right to restrain its further publication.
We will now consider the second Point: What is a publicaton? In Wirid-mer v. Hubbard, 19 Phila. 293, it is held: "Where
the writer of a letter authorizes others to read it than the per-.
son to whom it is addressed. this is a publication by the writer and
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he cannot restrain its further publication as being a private communication." The case at bar a.ffords even a stronger form of
publication. The letter was not only authorized to be read by one
stranger, but iwas deliberately published by the plaintiff himself in a public newspaper. The consequence of such ipublication is the loss of the plaintiff's property right in the letter.. "A
publication is regarded by law as a abandonment or dedication to
the public of all the rights in the intellectual property, and after publication the owner, or author, has no longer any exclusive right to control his work". 25 -Cyc. 1495.
The defendant, knowing that the plaintiff had suffered a
change of mind, and had decided to become a candidate, published
in his paper the plaintiff's former letter of declaration, omitting
the date. If this bill is to be sustained, it can be done only on
the ground of such omission.
The omission of the date was a material alteration and a fraudulent concealment of facts, which in this case -gives equity jurisdiction. The 'defendant maliciously inserted in his paper the
plaintiff's letter, purposely omitting the date so as to deceive
the public and prejudice -the candidate in the eyes of the people.
It can easily be seen what the injury would be to the plaintiff. Although now a candidate for election, this letter in the paper would
lead the public to believe the plaintiff had again changed his
mind and had a second time iwithdrawn his name as a candidate.
The people would naturally be disgusted with his actions and
vote for someone else, even though the plaintiff's name would
be on the -ballot. The injury -would be irreparable and it would
be impossible to estimate the damages with any degree of accuracy.
As the expansive tendencies of the common law are confined
within certain limits, and as its power to administer justice and
to grant the variety of remedies needed in the manifold relations
ef society is incomplete, the English and American system of
equity is preserved and maintained to supply this want, and to render the national jurisprudence adequate ,to the social needs..
Equity is so constructed upon comprehensive and fruitful principles, that it possesses an inherent capacity of expansion so as to
keep abreast of each succeeding generation and age. It consists
of those doctrines and rules, primary and remedial rights and
remedies, which the common law, by reason of its fixed methods
and remedial system, was either unable or inadequate, in the regular course of its devolopment, to establish, enforce and confer,

Dickinson Law Review
and which it therefore either tacitly omitted or openly rejected.
On account of the somewhat harsh and arbitrary nature of the common law in its primitive stage, these doctrines and rules of equity
were intentionally and consciously based upon the precepts of morality by the early chancellors, who borrowed the jural principles
of the moral code and openly incorporated them into their judicial legislation. This origin gave to the system which we call
equity a distinctive character which it has ever since preserved.
its gre. anderlying principles of right, justice and morality, so
far as the same can become the elements of a positive human jurisprudence; and these principles, being incorporated into the system. and being essentially unlimited, have communicated their own
vitality and power of adaptation to the entire branch of the national jurisprudence of which they are, so to speak, the substructure.
It follows that the department which we call "equity" is, as a
%vhole,more just and moral in its creation of rights and duties,
than the correlative department which we call the "law."
Considering the damage already caused as a result of the publioation, and to prevent further injury, the injunction should be
granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The questions presented by this case are: (1) whether the
publication by the defendant of the plaintiff's former letter of
declination is -a legal wrong; (2) if so, whether an injunction is a
proper remedy.
The necessary implication of the publication was that the
plaintiff, at the time of the publication, did not desire the nomination.
This was not true, and though the publication did not
constitute a libel it did constitute the tort of injurious falsehood. "That an action will lie for written or oral falsehood not
actionable per se nor even defamatory where they are maliciously
published, where they are calculated in the ordinary couise of
things to produce, and where they do produce actual damage, is
establish by law. Such an action is not one of slander or libel."
Ratcliffe v. Evans, 2 Q. B. 527.
The elements of the tort of injurious falsehood are: (1) that
the statement is untrue; (2) that it is published muliciously; (3)
that it causes actual damage. Salmond on Torts 454. The elements of this tort seem to be present in this case. The publication was untrue. It was maliciously made and the immediate result of the publication rwas a- violation of the plaintiff's right to
be freely voted for by his fellow citizens.
We are not impressed
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with the argument that this right -was a mere political right
and not a civil right whicn the courts will protect and enforce. The
plaintiff's chance of election to public office, like any salaried
business position, is a probable pecuniary expectancy, and, in our
opinion, is one form of what Terry calls the "right to unimpaired
pecuniary condition." It is a right of substance and importance
and should be recognized and protected by the courts.
The remedies afforded by the law for the protection of such
a right are, because of the difficulty of estimating the damages,
manifestly inadequate. An injunction should therefore be granted unless other considerations make the awarding of such relief
improper or inexpedient.
Two objections to the granting of an injunction may be urged:
(1) that equity has no jurisdiction over political matters; (2)
that the awarding of an injunction would contravene the consti
tutional guarantees of freedom of speech. The earlier cases support both of these objections, but in the more modern cases both
have been disregarded in cases like the present. Modern cases
are many in which equity jurisdiction over political matters is
recognized and enforced. Neal v. Young, (Ky.) 75 S. W. 1082;
Brown v. Cole, 54 Misc. 278; S. v. Houser, 122 Wis. 556. Restraining the publication will not, in our opinion, interfere with
the defendant's right of freedom of speech. The defendant is
not contending for the right to freely publish his own ideas and
opinions. The right contended for is simply that of republishing
the composition of another, with a single deliberate statement of
fact-in substance that the plaintiff vas no longer a candidateappended. The propriety of an injunction, under such circumstances, is well demonstrated in 29 Harvard Law Review 640,
and 30 Harvard Law Review 172.
The decree of the learned court below is affirmed.

MUMPER v. R. R. CO.
Negligence-Personal

Injuries-Damages-Future

Pain and Suf-

fering-Present Worth-Inadequacy of Charge
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mumper, in an action for injuries to himself arising from the
negligence of -a railroad company, sues for damages that he has
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undergone and for all that he will undergo.
The court instructed
the jury that they should compensate the plaintiff as well for the
suffering he will undergo as for that already undergone. It
aeclined to say, however, that only the present worth of the money
which, at the end of each year, twill represent the compensation
for the pain of that year, should be allowed. There 'was a veraict for Mumper for $5000. This is a motion for new trial.
Jesselsohn, for the plaintiff.
Loftus, for the defendant.
OPINION

OF THE COURT

JOBLIN, J. The question in the ease is the correctness of
the charge of the court. That is, was it proper to decline to instruct the jury to award the present wdrth of any damages allowed for future pain and suffering?
In McLane v. R. R. Co., 230 Pa. 29, it was held that in instructing a jury as to the measure of damages for pain and suffering in an accident case, the court should not suggest -the idea
of price or a sum of money as a pecuniary equivalent, but should
charge that-their verdict should be limited to compensation ana
compensation alone. An instruction, that the jury may allow "the
present worth of pain, if any, that is likely to occur in future,"
is erroneous, unless the iwords "present worth" are fully and accirately explained as meaning compensation.
In the case at bar, the judge refused to instruct the jury
that 'n estimating the damages which the plaintiff should be ent'tled to for future suffering, that only the present worth of the
money which woul-d represent compensation for pain and suffering should be allowed. Certainly when a judgment is reversed
because the judge failed to explain the meaning of the words
"present worth," it should be reversed when he declines to give
any instruction at all.
In McLane v. R. R. Co., supra, the lower court charged:
"While compensaVion for pain and suffering cannot be measured
by any fixed standards as 'we apply to things bought and sold
in the market, the lw
allows a reasonable sum, the ,amount to
be fixed- by the wise and fair discretion of the jury. As a result of the injury you will allow Mr. McLane compensation for
pain and suffering that he has undergone from the time of the
injury until the present time, and also the present worth of the
padin, if any, that is likely to be suffered by him in the future."
Stewart, J., in reviewing this charge said that it seems very ab-
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struse and obscure, even to a professional mind, and can 'be given
a host of interpretations. How then can the court expect a jury,
composed mostly of laymen, to understand the value of such instruction, unless it be accompanied by some explanation of those
enigmatical words "present worth?"
"Compensation expresses
a thought easily grasped, however difficult it may be to work
out in practical results. Worth is a quality of a thing that gives
it value and is as easily comprehended. The two words are not
equivalent and we -have no right to believe that the jury Will so
regard them."- "The importance of setting before the jury the
one and only standard which the law has for the measure of damages in cases of this kind has often been the subject of judicial
comment; while charges which are not explicit enough to exclude
from the minds of the jury the idea of price in connection with pain
awid suffering have frequently led to a reversal of the judgment.
It cannot be denied that the average juror's understanding of worth
associate -it with the idea of cost or price." The above case was
approved by Elkins, J., in Boggess v. R. R. Co., 234 Pa. 388.
In Goodhart v. R. R. Co., 177 Pa. 1, it is said: "An instruction that leaves the jury to regard pain and suffering as an independent item of damage to 'be compensated 'by a sum of money
that may be regarded as a pecuniary equivalent is not only inexact, but is erroneous." In this case the judgment of the lower
court was reversed.
Ifn cases of this type the law aims at one theory and that
is compensation and the importance of confining the jury's attention to this one consideration is the function of the court. Collins v. Feafey, 124 'Pa. 203.
The most recent decision 'we have been able to find which is
relevant to the point in issue is Saunders v. R. R. Co., 252 Pa. 79,
in which Mestrezat, J., said: "The learned judge told the jury
that they should ascertain the present worth of 'her future earnigs whlich is the usual way of presenting -the question to the
jury."
For the reasons above stated, a new trial is granted.
OPINION OF SiUPIMME COURT
In McLane v. Pittsburgh Rys. 'Co., 230 Pa. 29, the appellate
court objects to the trial judge's having told the jury that the
plaintiff was entitled to "compensation" for the pain already undergone, and to the "present worth" of pain likely to be under-
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gone in -the future, finding that the jurors would have understood' by "present worth" something other than compensation.
Of the instruction asked for here, no such misunderstanding
was possible. The court is asked to say to the jury that they
should "compensate" for both past and future suffering. It was
vsked also to say that the "present worth", not of the suffering,
but of the money that would represent, at the end of each year,
the compensation for the suffering of that year, should be allowed.
If the suffering of the first year, should be compensated, it
Ehould 'be compensated by a definite sum of money. If the suffering continues, of the same quality and degree, during a second year, the sufferer should be compensated for that also, by a
definite sum of money. In what other way is compensation to
be made, than by the -payment of money?
But, the plaintiff is to be paid now, for suffering that 'he will
suffer tnvo, three, five, ten years hence. Plainly then he is not
to receive the amount of money now, that would be paid -him at
the end of the third, fifth, or tenth year, if the suffering had
been already borne, but only a sum which increased -by the interest on it, at 6 per cent, for the interval between the present,
and the end of the 3d, 5th or 10 year, would equal that sum,
that is, the present worth of such sum. If jurors are too ignorant
to understand the expression, the ":present worth of pain," it can
hardly be suspected, having gone to school and studied arithmetic, and the computation of interest, that they do not understand what is meant by the present worth paid now of a sum o!
money to be paid in the future.
If, when the verdict is rendered, five or six years' pain has
,been suffered, 'would it not be competent for the jury to consider
the period as broken into years and to estimate the compensation
for the pain of each of these years? And if so, ,why should they
not consider the future as broken into years, and estimate the
compensation for each succeeding year?
To ash the jury to ascertain compensation for 10 years' pain
in the lump, and to forbid its ascertaining the compensation for
each of these years, is plainly to ask them to make a rough guess,
a guess which would be as likely to err on the side of the defend
ant -as of the plaintiff. If pain should not be compensated at all,
,because of .the want of equivalence between pain and money, let
the law say so. But, if pain can properly be compensated, two
years' pain should be compensated twice as much as one year's,
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the pain being equally severe, and debilitating. Pain varies in
intensity, and duration, and the same pain lasting for a year
needs as compensation, less than the same quality of pain lasting
two years. Why should the jury not fix in its mind, the indemnity for a years' pain, and multiply it by the number of years of
its continuance, if -it is not to 'slur over its track?
The suggestion is made, in Bostwick v. Railways Co., 255 Pa.
,:87, that it is impraoticable to estimate the present
orth of
damages. Yet, such estimation is allowed. What is objected to
is the making of an estimate of the damages for the pain for one
year, and, allowing for rhe anticipated payment, multiplying the
damages thus estimated, .by the number of years through which
it is anticipated that the pain will last. However unsatisfactbry
the philosophy of this case may seem, we must give effect to it,
end sustain the judgment of the trial court.

HANNAN VS. NEWVILLE BOROUGH
Municipalities-Paving-Bonds---Increase
Constitutional Law.

of

Indebtedness-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The borough of NewvIlle passed an ordinance for the paving of
streets, and the assessment of the cost was placed on the abutting
properties. The work was done, the borough issued bonds equal ta
the assessments, and paid them to the contractor. One of those for
.100.00 has been transferred to Hannun, who sues upon it. The
defense is that the issue of the bonds increased the debt beyond
the Constitutional limit. If the assessments are ultimately collected, there will be an adequate fund for the payment of the
bonds. The verdict was for the ;defendant under instruction of
the court that the bonds were void& Motion for a new trial.
Pauxtis, for the plaintiff
Holderbaum, for the defendant
OPINION OF LOWER COURT
LAROSSA, J. This was an action of assumpsit to recover the
sum of one hundred dollars due on a certain bond issued by the borough to pay for the cost of paving certain streets. The bond
which the plaintiff holds was originally issued to the contractor in
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pursuance of the contract.
The bonds, primarily, rest for security on assessments to be made on property holders along the lie
of improvements, and the bondholders must look to the assessments
for payment, but this recourse may be lost if the city or borough
fails in its duty. It must make assessments and file liens to secure payment- as provided by law. Dime Dep. etc. Bank v. Scranton, 208 Pa. 383.
The defense interposed was that the'issue of bonds was void,
because it increased debt of borough beyond the constitu.onal imitation. The court directed a verdict for the defendant with the instruction that the -bonds nvere void. This is a motion for a new
trial.
As the facts do not disclose .what the assessable valuation of
the borough is, we cannot say whether the constitutional limit has
been reached or not, but as our supreme court has held in the case
of Gable vs. Altoona, 200 Pa., 15, that notwithstanding the fact
that the constituional limit has been exceeded in the issuance of
nonds, such bonds are valid -and collectible from the 'borough, it
is, therefore immaterial to determine this question.
"There is no constitutional restriction on municipal expenditures p'ovided they are paid as they go. What is prohibited is
the incurring of debt.
If the borough has the money on hand,
or protrudes at the time a present means of raising it otherwise
than by loan, it may contract for expenditure without restriction.
"If means are adopted which in good faith according to reasonable expectation will produce a sufficient fund, the contract entered into on the faith of them shobld not be held unlawful on
account of unintentional miscalculation or an accidental and unexpected failure to produce the full result.
"The constitutional restriction c'as not intended to make. municipalities dishonest, nor to prevent those who contract with them
from collecting their just claims, but to check rash expend.tures
on credit and to prevent loading the future with the results of
present inconsiderate extravagance."
Addyston Pipe and Steel
Co., v. -City of Corry, 197 Pa. 41; Gable v. Altoona, 200 Pa. 15.
We think the loss should, in equity and justice ,fall on the
borough, fwhich has Teceived the full consideration stipulated for,
.ather than on the bondholders who paid their money to the contractor for the bonds given to said contractor as consideration for
the pavIng done.
The motion for a new trial is therefore granted.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
creation of debts in
forbids the
The constitution
exceed
7
per
all,
shall
which,
in
etc.,
borough,
propervalue of the taxable
cent of the assessed
ty therein. The borough has issued bonds the sum of which exceeds 7 per cent of the assessed property. Ordinarily, these bonds
would be void. The borough however "has assessed the abuttinT
properties to the extent of the bonds. These assessments are a
source whence, independently of general taxation, the bonds may
he paid. Although, literally, the borough has. by the issue of the
bonds increased its debt, this increase is only for a few months,
and until payment can be secured from the owners of the propSuch temporary increase of debt with a source
erties assessed.
,whence payment will -be secured, witbout taxation, is not considered as such an increase as' the constitution contemplates. Fep.
escussion of this matter in 15 IDkckinson Law Review, pp. 49, 50.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

BAXTER v. STREET RAILWAY CO.
Street Railways--Construction of Power Line-Authority-Charter - Municipal Ordinance - Right of Property Owner of
Abutting Land-Bill in Equity-Injunction-Act of June 19,
1871, P. L. 1861
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was incorporated to construct and operate a railway from a point in town9hip X, to the line of a city railway in
the same county. It subsequently applied to the governor for the
It began
right to build an extension to the center of the city.
the construction of the railway, not in the township, but in the
city. Baxter owns a house on a street in the city on which it is
intending to lay the tracks. The city has authorized the occupwtion of the streets. It does not appear that the townshilp la%,afnthorized the use of the road over which the charter authnrizes
the laying of the track, nor that the pronerty oawners on the road
have consented. Baxter files this bill to prevent the laying of
the tracks before his house.
Blumberg, for the plaintiff.
Zigmand, for the defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
BORTON, J. It is a general rule in the construction of street
railways that a townsh.p cannot inwpose such a burden upon roads
without the corsent of the abutting landowners, but a city or borough nlay impose the construction of a street railvay upon the
city or borough streets. Tbc if the plaintiff is to prevail in
the present action, it will consit:ute an exception to this general
rule.
It does not appear that the railway company has secured
the consent of the abutting landowners in the township, and until
this is shown we must presume th-at such consent 'hald not been
obtained. For the burden is irpon the defendant to show that it
had the right to construct the line. Curry v. Piftsburgh Railway
Co., 251 Pa. 340. The consent of the municipality is a subsequent incident.
Any construction upon an extension before consent is obtained along the entire charter route is illegal and an excessive
burden upon the abutting land owners, along this extension. In
the case of P. R. R. Co. v. Turtle Creek Valley Elec. Ry. Co., 179
Pa. 584, the court held that "untll -the consent of the boroughs and
townships whose highways the route was proposed to occupy
had been obtained, the company had no fgtht to enter upon .the
construction of its line of railway or any ipart of it." We find the
same holding in Pa. R. R. Co. v. Montgomery County Pass. Ry.
Co., 167 Pa. 62; Wheeler and Boody v. P. R. R. Co., 194 Pa. 539.
Hannum v. Railway Co., 200 Pa.. 44, is a case similar to the
one at 'bar. Hannum, a property holder in Chester, brings a bill
for an order enjoining the Electric Railway Co. from laying
tracks along his property, on the ground that the company was
chartered to construct its line In an aidjoining township and had
not then secured the consent of the land owners along the charter
route. Hannum secured his injunction, the court 'deciding that
"the consent -of the.municipality is immaterial, if it stands alone,
M1unicipal consent connot create or enlarge corporate franchises,
and where a street railway company has a trunk franchise and a
branch franchise, if the trunk has no sufficient legal existence,
its branches must also fail and the murtcipality's consent t& their
construction will not avail the company." This case was reversed
upon subsequent argument and changed facts in Hannum v. Railway Co., 221 Pa. 454. But in no way did this reversal affect the
previous rule laid down. And noawhere can we find that the
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authority of Hannum v. Railway Go., 200 Pa. 44, has been contridicted. The case holds explicitly that, by the Act of June 19,
1871, P. L. 1361, a property owner in a city on the line of a
street railway company has a standing to question the authority of
the company to construct its road in front of his property.
The plaintiff has a right to invoke the aid of the court to
iestrain a nuisance on the street in front of -his premises. P. R.
R. Co.'s Appeal, 115 Pa. 514; Quaker City Elevated R. R. Co.,
161 Pa. 396; Harrisburg and Mechanicsburg Elec. Ry. Go. v.
Harrisburg, Carlisle and Chambersburg Turnpike Co., 15 C. C.
Rep. 389. The unlawful construction of the railway in this case
aid constitute such a nuisance as to entitle the plaintiff to his in,unction to prevent the construction along this city extension,
Lntil the consent of the property owners along the route can be
shown to have been obtained.
Injunction granted.

OPINION OF SUIPREME COURT
The railway company, while it might begin its construction
with the city extension, had no right to lay its tracks in the city,
unless it had the right to lay the main tr'ack in the township.
The Constitution of Pennsylvania says that "No street passenger railway shall be constructed within the limits of any city,
borough or township, without the consent of the local authorities,"
3 g. of the supervisors of the township. There is no right to construct the tracks in the city until the township's consent to the
construction within it of the track has been secured. R. R. Co.
v. Electric Railway Co., 179 Pa. 584.
Since the act of 1907 street railway companies may occupy
under the power of eminent domain, and therefore without the
owners of such property, or of land abutting in the street or road,
streets, roads, or private property, without the consent of the
consent of the owners, on making compensation.
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-Since the right to build in the township is not yet perfected
by the consent of the supervisors, and since the defendant has no
means of securing this consent, it has no right to construct its
road in the city. The learned court below has properly enjoined it from such construction.
Affirmed.

